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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In recent years, federal policy has encouraged the 
arbitration of unsettled labor disputes as the terminal point 
in the grievance procedures of collective bargaining 
agreements. Under such policy, the judicial function is not 
to review the merits of an arbitration award but is limited 
to a determination of whether the award "draws its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement." United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593, 597 (1960). The narrow issue presented to us by 
this appeal requires us to make such a determination. 
 
Local Union #272 of the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union) initiated a 
grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (the 
Agreement) with Pennsylvania Power Company (the 
Company) covering production and maintenance employees 
at its Bruce Mansfield Plant (the Plant) with respect to 
certain early retirement benefits. The Company offered 
these benefits in a separate cooperative agreement 
conditional upon the production and maintenance 
employees' cooperation with management's efforts to 
improve efficiency. The grievance proceeded to arbitration 
and the arbitrator found that the Union and its member 
employees had failed to cooperate with the Company's 
efficiency efforts. However, the arbitrator concluded that the 
failure of the Company to provide early retirement benefits 
to the Union members but to provide them to its 
supervisory personnel constituted a violation of its 
collective bargaining agreement with the Union. The award 
required the Company to provide voluntary retirement 
program (VRP) benefits to the Union member employees at 
the Plant. 
 
The Company timely filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania seeking to vacate the award. The District 
Court declined to vacate the award. We reverse. 
 





The Company is a public utility engaged in the generation 
of electric power at its Plant in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. 
The Union represents the production and maintenance 
employees of the Plant,1 excluding office clerical employees, 
guards, other professional employees and "supervisors as 
defined in the National Labor Relations Act as amended." 
The Agreement became effective on February 16, 1996, for 
a period of three years. 
 
Article 1, section 3 of the Agreement provides that"[t]he 
Company and the Union agree that they will not 
discriminate, coerce, nor intimidate any employee because 
of membership or non-membership in the Union." 
 
The Company and the Union also separately agreed that 
they would "actively support and participate in a joint effort 
to improve the competitive position of the power plant 
represented by the Union." To encourage productive and 
financial efficiency in the face of impending deregulation in 
the electric generation industry, and the consequent"period 
of transformation," the Cooperative Agreement provided 
that the Company would utilize a voluntary retirement 
benefits program if it needed to reduce its workforce at the 
Plant. In return, the Union promised to cooperate with the 
Company in attaining production efficiency. The 
Cooperative Agreement expressly provided that both 
prerequisites -- determining the necessity to reduce 
workforce and determining whether the Union had 
cooperated in attaining production efficiency -- were within 
the sole discretion of the Company. The Company 
incorporated similar cooperative agreements in the 
collective bargaining agreement with other unions at its 
other plants. 
 
In 1998, the Company notified the Union that there 
would be no workforce reductions at the Plant. In addition, 
even if the workforce were to be reduced, it notified the 
Union that the Plant bargaining unit employees would not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Company operates other electric generating plants in 
Pennsylvania and Ohio. They are not covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement involved in this dispute. 
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be provided voluntary retirement benefits because the 
Company had determined that the Union had not met the 
qualifying conditions. In the meantime, the Company did 
offer such voluntary retirement benefits to bargaining unit 
employees at its other plants because the Company had 
determined that the unions representing those employees 
had cooperated with the Company and met the qualifying 
conditions. The Company also offered voluntary retirement 
benefits to supervisory personnel at both the Bruce 
Mansfield Plant and its sister plants. 
 
As a result of the disparate treatment between the Plant 
bargaining unit employees and their supervisors with 
respect to the VRP benefits allegedly "paid out of their own 
pension plan," the Union filed a grievance under the 
collective bargaining agreement on April 20, 1998. The 
Union submits that it "did not claim that its members were 
entitled to the VRP benefits under the cooperative 
agreement, nor did it ever claim that the supervisors were 
party to the cooperative agreement or within the same 
bargaining unit." The Union processed the grievance to 
arbitration. 
 
The monies funding the Company pension benefits 
program are provided solely by the employer and 
maintained in a common fund.2 The same pension plan 
covers all employees, both bargaining unit employees and 
supervisory personnel. 
 
The arbitrator found that since the Union had not 
cooperated with the Company in attaining production 
efficiency that the Cooperative Agreement was not violated. 
Next, the Union claimed that the Company violated the 
anti-discrimination provision of the collective bargaining 
agreement. First, the Union alleged that providing such 
benefits to bargaining unit employees at other plants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Union in its brief argues that "the pot of money used to pay the 
supervisory personnel was funded by the supervisory personnel and the 
bargaining unit employees." (Br. at 2) This is erroneous; at oral 
argument counsel for the Union acknowledged that only the Company 
funds the retirement pension plan. The amount of monies paid into the 
pension fund by the employer on behalf of the Union member employees, 
however, was the subject of collective bargaining. 
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without providing them to the Bruce Mansfield Plant 
bargaining unit employees violated the anti-discrimination 
provision. The arbitrator disagreed. The arbitrator reasoned 
that bargaining unit employees at other plants were not 
similarly situated to the Bruce Mansfield Plant bargaining 
unit employees because the former had cooperated with the 
Company in attaining production efficiency and the latter 
had not. 
 
Second, the Union claimed that the Company violated the 
anti-discrimination provision because it offered retirement 
benefits to supervisory personnel at the Plant but denied 
them to the bargaining unit employees. This argument 
found favor with the arbitrator. He reasoned that because 
pension payments for supervisors and the production and 
maintenance employees were drawn from the same fund 
and supervisors were subject to the same qualifying 
conditions, the disparate treatment amounted to a violation 
of the anti-discrimination provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement. Therefore, the arbitrator directed 
that the voluntary retirement benefits be afforded to 
qualified bargaining unit employees at the Plant. 
 
Challenging the award on legal and policy grounds, the 
Company timely filed suit in the United States District 
Court pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 185(a) to vacate the arbitration 
award. The complaint alleged the following grounds: (1) the 
arbitrator's decision did not derive its essence from the 
Agreement; (2) the award directly conflicts with Article VIII 
S 2.d of the Agreement which bars the arbitrator from 
changing or adding to any provisions of the Agreement; (3) 
the arbitration award violates public policy; and (4) the 
arbitrator's decision is not supported by the record. Both 
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District 
Court denied the Company's motion but granted the 
Union's motion. The District Court held that the arbitration 
award neither violated public policy nor ignored the clear 





The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management 
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Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 185(a). This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review is 
plenary, and we apply the same standard as the District 
Court in reviewing the arbitration award. Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
For almost a half century, the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently held that courts exercise a narrow 
and deferential role in reviewing arbitration awards arising 
out of labor disputes. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l 
Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987); W.R. 
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United 
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of Am. , 461 
U.S. 757, 764 (1983). Most recently, in Major League 
Baseball Players Association v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, ___ 
(2001), and Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. United 
Mine Workers of America, District 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 
(2000), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
principle. The rationale for the court's limited role is to 
ensure that the federal policy of encouraging arbitration of 
labor disputes is not subverted by excessive court 
intervention on the merits of an award. United Steelworkers 
of Am., 363 U.S. at 596. 
 
In light of the federal policy encouraging arbitration 
awards, there is a strong presumption in their favor. 
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Newark Typographical Union 
Local 103, 797 F.2d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 1986). However, the 
Supreme Court has at the same time made it clear that 
courts will intervene when the arbitrator's award does not 
"draw[ ] its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement" and the arbitrator is dispensing his or her own 
"brand of industrial justice." United Steelworkers of Am., 
363 at 597. 
 
Thus, an arbitration award ordinarily will not be vacated 
unless its essence is not drawn from the collective 
bargaining agreement. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 764. 
To put it differently, if the arbitrator's interpretation is in 
any rational way derived from the collective bargaining 
agreement, the arbitration award will not be disturbed. 
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 
(3d Cir. 1969). An arbitration award will not be vacated just 
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because the court believes its interpretation of the 
agreement is better than that of the arbitrator. W.R. Grace 
& Co., 461 U.S. at 764. It will be vacated, however, if there 
is a "manifest disregard" of the agreement. Ludwig Honold 
Mfg. Co., 405 F.2d at 1128. 
 
In United Paperworkers International Union, the Supreme 
Court made clear that an "arbitrator may not ignore the 
plain language of the contract." 484 U.S. at 38. 
Accordingly, this Court has held that "where there is a 
manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by 
principles of contract construction and the law of the shop" 
a reviewing court can vacate the award. Exxon Shipping Co., 
73 F.3d at 1295; see also Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. , 405 F.2d 
at 1128 (noting limited review but stating that arbitrator's 
interpretation must still be derived from agreement). In 
other words, an award may be set aside when an arbitrator 
manifested a disregard of his authorization, and instead 
"dispense[d] his own brand of industrial justice." Newark 
Morning Ledger Co., 797 F.2d at 165 (quoting United 
Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 597). 
 
As noted before, the arbitrator ruled that notwithstanding 
the Union's failure to comply with the qualifying conditions 
of the Cooperative Agreement for voluntary retirement 
benefits, to the extent the Company afforded Plant 
supervisory personnel voluntary retirement benefits it must 
afford the same benefits to the Plant bargaining unit 
employees. He reached this result on the basis of the 
collective bargaining agreement's prohibition of 
discrimination. 
 
The arbitrator reasoned: 
 
       Company witness Lubich made it clear that both 
       groups were in the same [pension] plan, designed for 
       all Ohio Edison and Pennsylvania Power bargaining- 
       unit employees and Management personnel. Thus, the 
       Company's making these VRP benefits available to 
       Supervisory personnel at Bruce Mansfield even though 
       they failed to meet the qualifying conditions, while 
       denying those benefits to Bruce Mansfield bargaining- 
       unit employees for failure to meet the same conditions 
       constituted improper discrimination, in violation of 
       Article I, Section 3 of the Agreement. 
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The Company here does not seek a judicial review of the 
merits of the arbitrator's award. The Company does not 
complain that the arbitrator erred in his interpretation of 
the Agreement. On the contrary, it claims that the 
arbitrator acted outside the scope of his contractually 
delegated authority. The Agreement specifically provides 
that the arbitrator may not alter or amend it. The Company 
contends that when the arbitrator ruled that the Company 
violated the anti-discrimination provision of the Agreement 
the arbitrator altered and amended the Agreement, acted 
outside the scope of his authority, and failed to draw his 
decision from the essence of the Agreement. 
 
In making this award, we agree with the Company that 
the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the Agreement. 
Moreover, he altered the Agreement in direct violation of its 
provision that he had no power to do so. He wrote into the 
contract that the Plant production and maintenance 
employees shall have the same benefits as the supervisory 
employees. The Agreement specifically excludes supervisory 
employees from its terms. Furthermore, the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) excludes supervisors from the 
bargaining unit or from inclusion in a collective bargaining 
agreement. Supervisors are not employees for collective 
bargaining purposes under the NLRA.3 
 
Nothing in the labor contract between the parties 
provides that production and maintenance employees shall 
have the same benefits as supervisory employees, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act in 1947 to 
specifically exclude supervisors from the definition of "employee." The 
exclusion, 29 U.S.C. S 152(3), provides in pertinent part: "The term 
`employee' shall include any employee . . . but shall not include an 
individual employed . . . as a supervisor." 
 
This exclusion "was accompanied by the congressional declaration in 
a new section 14(a)" providing in pertinent part that: 
 
       [N]o employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem 
       individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the 
       purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to 
collective 
       bargaining. 
 
Robert A. Gorman, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 34 (1976). 
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particularly voluntary retirement benefits. Nothing in the 
anti-discriminatory provision of the contract between the 
employer and its union employees remotely provides a basis 
for a determination that the Company discriminated 
against its Union employees because it did not offer the 
same VRP benefits it afforded its supervisors. Congress 
understood that the dynamics of industry and commerce 
required that loyalty owed by supervisory personnel to their 
employer excludes them from collective bargaining for rank 
and file employees. The one is ordinarily paid on an hourly 
basis to comply with federal wage and hours laws and the 
statutory provisions for overtime pay after 40 hours of work 
per week. Supervisors are ordinarily paid on a salary basis 
and are not subject to the same overtime provisions of the 
law. Benefits usually differ between the two groups with 
respect to health, life insurance, bonus and other benefits. 
 
Nothing in the Agreement, including the anti- 
discrimination provision, requires that supervisors and 
bargaining unit employees shall receive the same wages, 
vacations, or other benefits on the same basis as 
supervisors. The discriminatory provision of the Agreement 
refers solely to acts of discrimination between the Company 
and the Union and its members. This provision of the 
contract is common in many labor contracts. It apparently 
finds its genesis in sections 8(a) and (b) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 158 (a), (b) relating to 
unfair labor practices. Section 8(a)(3) provides in pertinent 
part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment 
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or 
discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 
U.S.C. S 158(a)(3). Section 8(b) provides in pertinent part 
that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or 
its agents: "(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title 
. . . (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection 
(a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee 
with respect to whom membership in such organization has 
been denied or terminated." 29 U.S.C. S 158(b). Because 
supervisors are not "employees" under the NLRA for 
purposes of collective bargaining, an employer's affording 
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retirement benefits to supervisors but not providing them to 
union member employees cannot possibly constitute 
discrimination between employees especially under the 
anti-discrimination section of the Agreement. 
Carried to its logical conclusion, the arbitrator's 
reasoning would require an employer to provide its rank 
and file employees with the same benefits it provides its 
supervisors unless the employer establishes separate, 
independent funding for benefits for supervisors and 
another for non-supervisors, even though the funding is 
provided entirely by the employer. This is neither the law 
nor industry practice. It is highly impractical, costly and 
may even be unmanageable with large companies that have 
multiple bargaining units in one plant or more, and many 
separate collective bargaining agreements, to maintain, 
separate funds, investments, records, and reports. 
 
The District Court concluded that the arbitrator's 
decision did not bring the supervisors under the terms and 
conditions of the Agreement, including the Cooperative 
Agreement. Rather, the District Court reasoned that the 
arbitrator simply concluded that "no explanation was given 
as to why supervisory personnel, unlike bargaining unit 
employees, were not subject to qualifying conditions for 
VRP benefits and such a lack of explanation amounted to 
discrimination in contravention of the [Agreement]." 
However, the employer had no obligation whatsoever to 
disclose in the grievance and arbitration proceedings its 
arrangements, contracts or obligations to its supervisors. 
Such explanation was irrelevant and we can see no 
evidentiary or legal reason for their production. 
 
The arbitrator had strayed far beyond the scope of the 
arbitration. A requirement that an employer disclose its 
contractual terms for benefits to its supervisors in a 
proceeding to which they are not a party, or else face an 
order that they provide similar benefits to their Union 
production and maintenance employees, has no basis in 
reality, law, or industry practice. Certainly no such 
requirement is contained in the Agreement between the 
Company and the Union. What the arbitrator has wrought 
here not only alters and amends the collective bargaining 
agreement but far exceeds the permissible powers of the 
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arbitrator. Were it applied generally in the marketplace, it 
would wreak consternation and havoc throughout American 
industry. The award amounts to nothing more than the 





Accordingly, the arbitrator's decision conflicts with the 
express provisions of the Agreement between the Company 
and the Union. The arbitrator has written into the contract 
a provision obligating the Company to pay its Union 
employees voluntary retirement benefits to which 
indisputably it never agreed and as to which the Union 
employees concededly were not entitled.4  The arbitrator's 
effort to justify the alteration of the collective bargaining 
agreement on the basis of an irrelevant discrimination 
clause in the Agreement is unreasonable and 
impermissible. The arbitrator has exceeded the scope of the 
arbitration provision and his decision fails to draw its 
essence from that Agreement.5 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed and 
the case remanded with direction to the District Court to 
vacate the award. Costs taxed against the appellee Union. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Appalachin Regional Health Care, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of 
America, AFL-CIO, Local 14398, 245 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 
122 S. Ct. 350 (2001), the court vacated an arbitrator's award because 
it conflicted with the express provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the Company and the Union. The court stated: "Even 
if we were to credit the arbitrator's construction of the Agreement as 
against its conflict with express provisions, we would still have to 
vacate 
the award as it imports notions not found in the Agreement itself." Id. at 
606. 
 
5. A reviewing court can set aside an arbitration award if enforcement of 
the award violates public policy. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 
62-63; Exxon Shipping Co., 73 F.3d at 1291. An award can also be 
overturned if the arbitrator's decision is not supported by the record. 
United Indus. Workers v. Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 
1993). In light of our ultimate disposition, we need not reach the 
Company's alternative arguments that the arbitration award should be 
vacated because it violated public policy or that the arbitrator's 
decision 
was unsupported by the record. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Just last Term, the Supreme Court reminded us how 
narrow our proper scope of review is in a case such as this. 
In Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. United Mine 
Workers of America, 531 U.S. 57 (2000), the Court wrote 
that when an "employer and union have granted to the 
arbitrator the authority to interpret the meaning of their 
contract's language," "[t]hey have `bargained for' the 
`arbitrator's construction' of their agreement, .. . [a]nd 
courts will set aside the arbitrator's interpretation of what 
their agreement means only in rare instances." 531 U.S. at 
61-62 (citation omitted). The Court continued: 
 
       Of course, an arbitrator's award "must draw its 
       essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the 
       arbitrator's own notions of industrial justice." 
       Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
       "But as long as [an honest] arbitrator is even arguably 
       construing or applying the contract and acting within 
       the scope of his authority," the fact that "a court is 
       convinced he committed serious error does not suffice 
       to overturn his decision." Ibid. 
 
Eastern Associated Coal Corporation, 531 U.S. at 62; see 
also Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey, 
121 S. Ct. 1724, 1728 (2001). 
 
The majority in this case overturns the arbitrator's 
decision because the majority strongly disagrees with his 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. The 
arbitrator held that the collective bargaining agreement 
obligates the employer to provide voluntary retirement 
benefits to union-member employees on the same terms as 
supervisors. In so construing the agreement, the arbitrator 
relied on article 1, section 3 of the agreement, the so-called 
anti-discrimination provision, which states that the 
company may not "discriminate" against "any employee 
because of membership or non-membership in the Union." 
Tracing this clause to Sections 8(a) and (b) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a) and (b), the majority 
disagrees with the arbitrator's interpretation, reasoning that 
"[b]ecause supervisors are not `employees' under the NLRA 
for purposes of collective bargaining, an employer's 
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affording retirement benefits to supervisors but not 
providing them to union member employees cannot 
possibly constitute discrimination between employees 
under the anti-discrimination section of the Agreement." 
Maj. Op. at 9-10. The majority goes on to observe that the 
arbitrator's reasoning is supported by "neither the law nor 
industry practice" and "is highly impractical, costly and 
may even be unmanageable" for some companies. Maj. Op 
at 10. 
 
I find the majority's interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement more persuasive than the 
arbitrator's, but I cannot agree that the arbitrator's decision 
did not "draw its essence from the contract" or that the 
arbitrator was not "even arguably construing the contract." 
As noted, the arbitrator's decision drew its essence from 
and was based on a construction of the anti-discrimination 
section. That the arbitrator probably misconstrued that 
provision is beside the point. The parties bargained for the 
arbitrator's construction of the agreement, and that is what 
they got. By intervening to rescue the Pennsylvania Power 
Company from one of the consequences of its bargain, the 
majority has exceeded the proper scope of our court's 
authority. I must therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
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